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the famine-born cohort. The conclusion is that the small observed changes in marriage rates 
of the famine born cohort are due to a significant decline in marital attractiveness. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
The ￿Great Leap Forward￿was a national-level political and economic exper-
iment carried out in China between 1958-1961.1 Collectivization of farming,
which began in the mid-￿fties, increased in speed and scope. Rural labor
was reallocated from agriculture towards industry: People were moved from
villages to work in urban factories, while agricultural land and labor were
directed towards steel production in ￿backyard furnaces￿ . In many locali-
ties, strong political incentives contributed to o¢ cial exaggeration of grain
yields and output, leading to a reduction in sown area, and excessive state
procurement and export. This was in addition to a state rationing system
that already favored urban industrial workers to the detriment of the villages.
The Greap Leap Forward resulted in one of the most severe famines in
Chinese history. Estimates of famine-related mortality range from 15 to 30
million deaths. Peng (1987) estimates that births lost or postponed resulted
in about 25 million fewer births.2 In general, the countryside was struck much
harder than cities.3 The economic experiment was abandoned by early 1962.
The mortality rate quickly fell and the birth rate also quickly recovered.
While the drop in birth rates is widely recognized, much less is known
about the e⁄ects on those who were born during the famine. The medical
literature reports that individuals su⁄ering nutritional deprivation either in
utero or in their infancy face severe deleterious long-run health e⁄ects (See
Barker, 1992). Recent research by Gorgens et. al. (2005), St. Clair et.
al. (2005), and Luo, Mu and Zhang (2006) provide some direct con￿rmation
for this in the case of China, focusing on such health-related outcomes as
stunting, obesity, and schizophrenia.
Not all the e⁄ects of the famine on the famine born cohorts were negative.
Due to the drop in the birth rates, the famine born cohorts were small relative
to adjacent birth cohorts. This scarcity should increase their relative values
in both the marriage and labor markets. Their increased value in the labor
market should also further add to their desirability in the marriage market.
1For an overview of the Great Leap Forward, see Lardy (1987).
2Ashton et. al. (1984) provide estimates at the national level of the magnitude of the
demographic crisis. See Peng (1987) for a detailed analysis of the impact of the famine at
the provincial level. Lin and Yang (2000) and Li and Yang (2006) examine causes of the
famine. Becker (1997) provides a narrative account.
3The famine extended beyond China￿ s traditional famine belt region. For example,
Sichuan province, where mass famines were rare, was one of the hardest struck.
2Ceteris paribus, the net e⁄ect of the famine on marital outcomes of famine
born cohorts is an aggregation of three e⁄ects: (1) a negative attractiveness
e⁄ect due to adverse health outcomes that reduces demand for famine born
spouses; (2) a positive attractiveness (wage) e⁄ect due to relative scarcity
of famine born cohorts in the labor market that increases their demand as
spouses; and (3) due to customary gender di⁄erences in ages of marriage,
there is an increase in spousal demand for famine born cohorts because of
their relative scarcity in the marriage market.
The famine also a⁄ected both pre and post-famine born cohorts. Pre-
famine born cohorts were young children at the time of the famine. The
famine would have adversely a⁄ected their health and human capital. The
least fortunate among them would have died. So again there are quantity
and quality e⁄ects on those who survived into marriageble age.4 How the
marital attractiveness of these individuals compares with that of the famine
born cohort is di¢ cult to assess apriori.
The upshot of the above is that there are large quantity and complicated
quality changes to the famine a⁄ected cohorts. The a⁄ected individuals also
match with each other in the marriage market. Thus, the observed marital
outcomes of the famine a⁄ected cohorts are equilibrium responses to these
quantity and quality changes. Due to the complex changes and responses,
there were heterogenous responses by di⁄erent a⁄ected cohorts.
The objective of this paper is to examine the e⁄ects of the famine on
the marital outcomes of the famine born and adjacent cohorts in Sichuan
and Anhui, two agricultural provinces which were severely a⁄ected by the
famine.5 We study the rural populations because the famine disproportion-
ately a⁄ected rural rather than urban communities.6
Figures 1 and 1a show the distributions of individuals by age in the 1990
Census for rural Sichuan and Anhui, respectively. Due to a high long-run
birth rate and mortality rates that increase with age, population by age
4Meng and Qian (2006) provide direct evidence on the health changes of these cohorts.
5In 1957, 86 and 92 percent of the labor force were in the primary (agriculture, ￿sheries
and forestry) sector in Sichuan and Anhui, respectively. Between 65-70 percent of GDP
originated in the primary sector. These data are taken from Xin Zhongguo wushi nian
tongji ziliao huibian, 2005). Further details are in Peng (1987).
6Peng(1987) documents that excess mortality was more severe in rural than in urban
areas. At the national level, the excess crude death rate for the urban population between
1958-1962 was 13.84 compared to 7.94 for the two preceding years. By comparison, the
excess crude death rate for the rural population rose from 11.45 to 24.45 over the same
period. See Peng (1987), p. 646.
3should be declining with age. The famine born cohort was 29-31 years old
men and women. As we can see in Figure 1 for Sichuan, the population
of the pre-famine born cohort (32-34) was also adversely a⁄ected by the
famine. That is, young children during the famine were less likely to survive
to adulthood. On the other hand, the panel also shows the quick recovery
in fertility (and subsequent survival to adulthood) after the famine. Figure
1a plots population by age for Anhui, which was also heavily a⁄ected by the
famine. Again, the drop in population began with the pre-famine cohort and
accelerated for the famine born cohort, and then recovered quickly after the
famine.
The paper provides two kinds of estimates of the e⁄ects of famine on mari-
tal behavior. First, using a ￿rst-di⁄erence methodology, we non-parametrically
estimate the total e⁄ect of the famine on the marital outcomes of the famine
a⁄ected cohorts. To this end, we estimate a set of statistics, the total gains
to marriages, which are a complete description of marital behavior by all
participants at a point in time. We estimate total gains for two di⁄erent
time periods. In the control period, we assume that marital behavior was
una⁄ected by the famine; in the treatment period, marital behavior was af-
fected by the famine. The estimated di⁄erences in total gains between the
two periods provide an estimate of the total e⁄ect of the famine on marital
behavior. Our total e⁄ect estimates incorporate both general equilibrium
and heterogeneous treatement e⁄ects. The estimates are consistent as long
as our ￿rst-di⁄erence methodology is able to control for other factors that
may have a⁄ected marital behavior between the two periods. Due to the
unusual non-linear e⁄ects of the famine on marital outcomes, we will argue
that our choices of the treatment and control groups are credible. We imple-
ment our ￿rst di⁄erence empirical strategy by comparing, within a province,
the marital behavior of the famine a⁄ected cohorts in 1990 to their same age
counterparts in 1982.7
Second, using a non-parametric structural marriage matching model, we
decompose the estimated total e⁄ects into quantity and quality e⁄ects. Our
structural model will be the CS marriage matching model (Choo and Siow
2006).8 The non-parametric total gains estimates provide one to one non-
7Initially, we used a di⁄erence in di⁄erences strategy. These estimates were di¢ cult to
interpret because the famine was national in scope and the control provinces that we used
were also a⁄ected by the famine.
8A marriage matching function is a production function for marriages (Pollard 1997,
4parametric estimates of the structural parameters of the CS model.
For both Sichuan and Anhui, there were small observed changes in the
marriage rates of the famine born cohorts relative to their adjacent aged
peers. There were large changes in choices of marital partners and total
gains for famine born cohorts relative to their adjacent aged peers. To a ￿rst
approximation, our decomposition shows that the bene￿t that the famine
born cohort derived from their relative scarcity was o⁄set by their decline
in marital attractiveness. The main substantive conclusion of this paper is
that the small observed changes in marriage rates of the famine born cohorts
are due to a substantial decline in their marital attractiveness. The main
methodological conclusion is that allowing for general equilibrium e⁄ects and
estimating heterogenous treatment e⁄ects are important because the pre-
famine born, famine born and post-famine born cohorts experienced very
di⁄erent but linked outcomes.
Can the decline in marital attractiveness of the famine born cohort be
captured by di⁄erences in educational attainment of the various cohorts? To
answer this question, we re-estimate the CS model, allowing now for match-
ing by both age and educational attainment. We show that the changes in
educational attainment for the famine born cohort are insu¢ cient to explain
changes in marital behavior of that cohort. The change in marital attractive-
ness of the famine born cohort is not well captured by the changes in their
educational attainment.
1.1 Literature review
Our paper is related to two literatures. First, it is related to the literature
that studies the e⁄ects of the ￿Great Leap Forward￿on social and economic
outcomes (E.g. Almond, et. al.; Chen 2007; Geogens, et. al. 2004; Meng
and Qian; Porter 2007). Of these papers, Almond et. al. and Porter study
the e⁄ects on the marriage market. We build on their work.
Both of these two papers use a regression framework to study the causal
e⁄ects of the famine on marital behavior of the a⁄ected cohorts. Both pa-
pers focus on homogenous treatment e⁄ects. Outcomes include marriage
rates, age at marriage, spousal age di⁄erences and other spousal character-
istics. They conclude that the famine had modest e⁄ects on marriage rates
Pollack 1990). Inputs are population vectors of types of individuals. Output is a matrix
of who marries whom, and who remains unmarried.
5caused the a⁄ected cohorts to marry later, increased spousal age gaps, and
decreased spousal education gaps. The two papers attribute the outcomes
to di⁄erent causal mechanisms. Almond et. al. emphasize the decline in
marital attractiveness of the famine born cohort whereas Porter emphasizes
the relative scarcity of famine born cohort in the marriage market. Almond
et. al. use variations in provincial mortality rates of the famine a⁄ected
cohorts as a regressor and interpret its estimated e⁄ect as due to changes
in marital attractiveness. Porter uses marital-share weighted adult sex ra-
tios of the famine a⁄ected cohorts within and across provinces as a regressor
and interprets its estimated e⁄ect as due to changes in sex ratios. Since the
famine increased mortality and decreased birth rates (and therefore even-
tual population supplies to the marriage market), it is di¢ cult to disentangle
empirically the two e⁄ects in a regression framework.
A famine e⁄ect on marital behavior in a marriage market is a general
equilibrium phenomenon. A regression using individual-level data of spousal
characteristics on individual attributes ignores these general equilibrium ef-
fects.9
Our paper relaxes the ￿either or￿ hypothesis, incorporates all general
equilibrium e⁄ects and estimates heterogenous treatment e⁄ects. We are
more restrictive in one important respect. The regression framework controls
for a wider variety of individual characteristics than we are able to do.10 Thus
we view our framework as complementary to the above papers.
Our paper is also related to the literature which studies the e⁄ect of ex-
ogenous variations in the sex ratios on marital outcomes (Akabayashi, 2006;
Bhrolchain 2001; Brainard 2006; Esteve i and CabrØ 2004; Francis 2007).
Many of the exogenous variations in sex ratios have both a quality and quan-
tity dimension due to the e⁄ects of war (e.g. Brainard; Esteve i and CabrØ;
and Francis). Even the variations in sex ratios due to superstition about
being born in ￿unlucky￿years have a quality dimension (Akabayashi). Indi-
viduals born in these ￿unlucky￿years su⁄er a social stigma that makes them
less desirable in the marriage market. But they bene￿t from being relatively
9The inability of the regression framework using individual level data to deal with
general equilibrium e⁄ects is well known (E.g. Imbens and Woolridge 2008; Heckman,
Lochner and Taber 1999). Using marriage rate regressions, Angrist 2002 found that the
causal e⁄ect of changes in the sex ratio on the male marriage rate is inconsistent with that
found for the female marriage rate. Choo and Siow 2006 also provide another example.
10Conceptually, our framework allows for many individual characteristics. Practically,
as we increase the number of characterisitics, we will run into a thin cell problem.
6scarce in the labor and marriage market. Our framework can be applied to
disentangle these two e⁄ects in these environments.
Previous researchers who have studied marriage rates and large exogenous
sex ratio changes in other contexts have also often found small e⁄ects of these
changes on marriage rates, e.g. Bergstrom and Lam (1994) and Bhrolchain
(2001). As we do in this paper, these researchers attribute these small e⁄ects
to ￿ exible spousal choices in the face of large changes in sex ratios. But small
changes in marriage rates due to a large exogenous change in sex ratio may
be deceiving. In the case of this paper, the small changes mask o⁄setting
large quantity and quality e⁄ects.
2 Methodology
This paper uses three statistics to study marital behavior: marriage rates,
marriage shares and a marital accounting scheme, total gains to marriage.
Let t denote the year of the census, t = f1982;1990g. At each year,
individuals are di⁄erentiated by their age and or education. Let j denote
type j women and i denote type i men. j = 1;::;J and i = 1;::I. F t is the
population vector of women at time t with typical element ft
j, the number
of women of type j in year t. Mt is the population vector of men at time t
with typical element mt
i, the number of men of type i in year t.
￿t
j is the number of married women of type j year t. ￿t
i is the number of
married men of type i year t. Let the number of unmarried type i men be
￿t
i0 = mi ￿￿t
i; and the number of unmarried type j women be ￿t
0j = fj ￿￿t
j.
Let ￿t
ij be the number of type i men married to type j women. There are
I ￿ J types of marriages at time t. Let ￿t be an I ￿ J matrix whose typical
element is ￿t
ij.
The following accounting identities, which are general equilibrium con-








￿ij = mi 8 i
￿i0;￿0j;￿ij ￿ 0 8 i;j
7The ￿rst equation above says that the sum of unmarried type j women
plus all the type j women in di⁄erent types of marriages must equal the
number of type j women. The second equation above says that the sum of
unmarried type i men plus all the type i men in di⁄erent types of marriages
must equal the number of type i men. Finally, the number of individuals in
any marital choice must be non-negative.
Rather than working with ￿t, Mt and F t, most researchers use simpler
statistics to describe the marriage market at time t. The most common















; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J


















; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J
Marriage rates or odds ratios are not summary statistics for marital be-
havior. To study who marries whom, we ￿rst study spousal shares by types
















; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J (3)
st
jji is the share of type j women among type i￿ s wives. st
ijj is the share of
type i men among type j￿ s husbands. Shares are informative about spousal
subsitution patterns, i.e. who to marry. By de￿nition, the sum of the shares
across di⁄erent types of spouses for the same type of individual is one. Thus
the shares are not informative about the choice of whether to marry or not.
To investigate how substitution a⁄ects the decision to marry and vice
versa, we need a statistic that will link the two e⁄ects. To that end, let the










; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (4)
8The numerator is the number of fi;jg marriages at time t. The denom-
inator is the geometric average of the number of unmarrieds, ￿t
i0 and ￿t
0j at
time t. Let ￿t be the I ￿ J matrix with typical element ￿t
ij:











jji; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (5)
￿t
ij; the total gains to fi;jg marriages, is the average of the log odds
of marriages for i type men and j type women plus the average of the log
shares. Thus the total gains to marriage combines substitution patterns with
marriage rates.
We will now show that ￿t is an alternative accounting scheme for marital
behavior, ￿t.11 ￿t has I ￿J elements and ￿t also has I ￿J elements. Given
￿t, Mtand F t, we can use the system of I￿J equations (4) to recover ￿t. By
de￿nition, there an admissible solution to this system of equations, namely
￿t. CS shows that the solution is locally unique.12
Consider a new time t0 with di⁄erent marital matches and population









; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (6)
￿t0 is a complete description of the marriage distribution in time t0. Let
￿X ￿ Xt0￿Xt. Then ￿￿ is a complete description of the changes in marital
behavior between the two periods.
Let t denote a period in which the famine did not a⁄ect marital behavior.
We use ￿t to characterize marital behavior at time t. Let t0 denote a period in
which the famine a⁄ected marital behavior. We will use ￿￿ as our estimates
of the causal e⁄ect of the famine on the marital behavior of famine a⁄ected
individuals. Because ￿t0 is a complete accounting scheme for marital behavior
at time t0, it imposes no apriori restriction on marital behavior. ￿￿ can be
estimated nonparametrically. Thus ￿￿ is a consistent estimate of the causal
11It cannot deal with marital choices with zero observation. I.e. ￿t
ij must be ￿nite.
12Global uniquness may also apply because the solution has to satisfy all the accounting
identities in (1). In widely di⁄erent applications (Choo and Siow 2006 and 2006a) including
this paper, we have not found multiple solutions.
9e⁄ect of the famine on marital behavior for the famine a⁄ected cohorts as
long as t and t0 are valid control and treatment periods.
If there are changes other than the famine which a⁄ect marital behavior
between t and t0, then ￿￿ will be an inconsistent estimate of the causal
e⁄ects of the famine. There were other social and economic changes between
1982 and 1990, including migration behavior, that may have a⁄ected marital
behavior between the two periods. We will assume that these other changes
are not correlated with ￿M and ￿F, the changes in population supplies due
to the famine. As we will show later, the behavior of ￿￿ is so di⁄erent for
the pre-famine, famine born and post-famine cohorts, and so closely tied to
changes in population supplies caused by the famine, that it will be di¢ cult to
imagine other factors causing these changes in marital behavior. We cannot
identify level and trend e⁄ects of the famine to the extent that these other
factors have level and trend e⁄ects on marital behavior.
The above is as far as we can go in reduced-form estimation. Tautologi-
cally, total gains at time t is a function of population vectors and exogenous






The famine simultaneously a⁄ected population vectors, Mt0 and F t0, and











In order to disentangle observed changes in marital behavior between
e⁄ects due to changes in marital preference and e⁄ects due to population
supplies, we need to posit a model for ￿(:) and to estimate ￿t and ￿t0. CS
is such a model. In their static model of the marriage market, total gains
measures the expected marital gain to a random fi;jg pair marrying relative
to them not marrying. The thought experiment is as follows. Consider a
randomly chosen type i male marrying a randomly chosen type j female. We
compare the marital output of this randomly chosen couple to the geometric
average of what they would have obtained if they remained unmarried. So
once the individuals are chosen, they can only compare whether to marry or
forever remain unmarried. This measure of relative expected marital gain
is una⁄ected by marriage market conditions because we are not choosing
the couple based on relative scarcity, nor do we allow them to marry other
individuals.
10Thus in CS, ￿t are exogenous, independent of population vectors, Mt
and F t, or other determinants of marriage market conditions at time t. In





￿￿ = ￿￿ (9)
Not only do ￿(:) not depend on Mt or F t, it is also the identify function.
￿￿ is always a reduced form estimate of the total e⁄ect of the famine
on marital behavior. Equation (9) says that the di⁄erence in total gains
measures exactly the changes marital attractiveness between the two time
periods, independent of the changes in population vectors. By using CS or
equivalently equation (9) to interpret the estimates of ￿￿, we have moved
from a reduced form to a structural interpretation.
If we have estimates of ￿t, we can predict what the new marriage distri-
bution b ￿t0 will be with new population vectors Mt0 and F t0, and ￿t0 = ￿t for









; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (10)
If the only e⁄ect of the famine was to change population supplies between
t and t0, then ￿t0
ij = ￿t
ij and the marital distribution at time t0 should be b ￿t0
as in the system of equations (10). The predicted marriage distribution,
b ￿t0, satis￿es the non-trivial accounting constraints described in equations (1)
(CSS and Siow (2008)). So the CS model implies that b ￿t0 is an estimate of
the e⁄ects of quantity changes caused by the famine on marital behavior at
time t0.
If the new actual marriage distribution, ￿t0, di⁄ers from the predicted
marriage distribution, b ￿t0, ￿￿ 6= 0. Because total gains completely describe
the marriage distribution, the previous statement is always true. Without
a model of marital behavior, we do not know how much of ￿￿ is due to
changes in marital attractiveness, ￿￿, and how much is due to changes in
population supplies, ￿M and ￿F. The bite of CS is that it implies that ￿￿,
the changes in total gains, only measure changes in marital attractiveness,
￿￿, due to the famine.
If the CS model is incorrect, then our decomposition of the causal e⁄ects
of the famine into quantity and quality changes will be wrong. Because CS is
11a fully saturated (just identi￿ed) model, the validity of CS in this particular
application is untestable. CS is unlikely to be exactly right. Siow (2008)
shows that generalized versions of CS will in general not reduce to (8). Thus
CS should be regarded as an approximate model of actual marital behavior.
We provide an indirect test to show that CS is not vacuous. In demog-
raphy, CS is known as a marriage matching function (MMF), an empirical
model of the marriage market. Although the objective has been known for
some time, it has been di¢ cult to come up with empirically tractable and
yet behaviorally attractive MMFs.13 The main di¢ culty is how to deal with
alternative spousal choices while minimizing a priori identifying restrictions.
The current standard MMF in demography is the harmonic mean MMF (E.g.












ij; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::;J
Like CS, this model will ￿t any cross section data perfectly. As a struc-
tural model, it has two de￿ciencies. First, it ignores the problem of alter-
native spousal choices. Changes in mt
i0 or ft
j0 do not a⁄ect ￿t
ij. Second, the
accounting constraints, (1), are not imposed.
We will show that using the harmonic mean MMF in our context leads
to inadmissible predictions, predicted marriage rates which exceed one.
3 Summary Data and Sex Ratios
All the data presented here come from the one percent household sample of
the 1982 Census of China and the one percent clustered sample of the 1990
Census of China. Wang (2000) and Mason and Lavely (2001) are useful re-
sources on the details of the censuses and data samples. In our analysis, we
only use those data pertaining to individuals who reside in rural counties.
This can be rationalized on two grounds: ￿rst, the countryside was more af-
fected by the famine than the cities,14 and second, the rural marriage market
was largely self-contained, and highly local in nature.
In the Data Appendix, we discuss how rural is de￿ned, and examine sev-
eral other data-related issues, including migration. Migration may matter
13.... the frustrating search for a mathematically tractable and sociologically realistic
￿marriage function￿ . (Preston and Richards (1975))
14See footnote 10.
12in number of ways for our analysis. First, migration of rural born out of
Anhui (Sichuan), and in-migration into rural Anhui (Sichuan) may bias our
estimates of the sex ratios that we use in the construction of our marriage
matching functions. Second, some of the migration may have been for mar-
riage.
Unfortunately, the 1982 Census contains no information on migration,
and for the 1990 Census the information is limited to migration that occurred
between 1985 and 1990. Using the more complete data provided by the 2000
Census, we are able to construct alternative estimates of the sex-ratios based
on the rural-born population, including those currently living outside the
province. As detailed in the appendix, the di⁄erences with the estimates we
use are small. Moreover, the bias is fairly similar across the age cohorts that
make up our analysis.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for rural counties in Anhui and
Sichuan from the 1982 and 1990 censuses. The average spousal age di⁄erences
in the two provinces ranged between two to three years. Any observed spousal
age di⁄erence is an equilibrium outcome determined by marriage market
conditions. Under average marriage market conditions existing in China at
the times of the 1982 and 1990 censuses, the average spousal age di⁄erence
was about three years. Because the censuses collect ages by years, we assume
that the customary equilibrium spousal age di⁄erence is three years.
The marriage rates for women are higher than that for men in both
provinces and both censuses.
High education is de￿ned as completing elementary school. The table
shows that less than ￿fty percent of men or women in rural Sichuan and
Anhui completed elementary school.
The ￿rst-order impact of the famine on the marital behavior of individuals
would have been on the famine born cohort and their customary spouses. For
men who usually marry women three years younger, the customary spouses
for the famine born men were the post-famine born women. For famine born
women, their customary spouses were the pre-famine born men. Thus, we
consider individuals born between 1956 to 1964 to be the famine a⁄ected
cohorts. We observe the marital behavior of individuals in 1982 and 1990.
For convenience, the ages of these individuals in 1990 are given in Table 2.
Our main interest is to examine the behavior of the famine on marital
behavior in the 1990 census. The reason for focusing on the 1990 census is
that by 1990, the post-famine cohort was 26-28 years old. Most women of
that age category and older would have acquired their permanent marital
13status. Except for 26 and 27 years olds, most men of that age category and
older would also have acquired their permanent marital status.
We will use individuals of the same age and characteristics in 1982 as
controls for their counterparts in 1990. That is, the control group for post-
famine individuals are those who were 26-28 in 1982, the control group for
famine born cohort are those who were 29-31 in 1982, and the control group
for the pre-famine cohort are those who were 32-34 in 1982. In general, as
shown in the immediate table above, individuals in the control groups, of age
26 and older in 1982, were not a⁄ected at birth by the famine. There is one
year of overlap. Individuals of age 26 in 1982, used as a control group for
pre-famine 26 years olds in 1990, are also in the post-famine group in 1990.
Whether this year of overlap will a⁄ect the results is an empirical issue which
will be resolved shortly.
The eighties were a period of active social and economic changes in China,
including a marriage reform act of 1981. Most of the social and economic
changes in the eighties, including migration, have level and or trend e⁄ects.15
Thus, we need to make a case that it is reasonable to use a ￿rst-di⁄erence
strategy to study the impact of the famine on marital outcomes. We make
our case in two steps. First, we will show that in 1982, within a province,
marital behavior of the three control groups di⁄ered from each other by at
most a smooth age trend due to lifecycle e⁄ects, i.e., absent smooth lifecyle
e⁄ects, the marriage behavior of 26-28, 29-31, and 32-34 years olds in 1982
was similar to each other.16 Conditional on marriage, the distribution of
spousal shares were similar for all three cohorts. So there was no di⁄erence
in the choice of spouses between the three cohorts. Since we are comparing
marital behavior by age groups, we are controlling for lifecycle e⁄ects in the
timing of marriage.
Second, the observed changes in marital behavior in 1990 for the famine
a⁄ected cohorts follow a distinct non-linear age pattern that coincides with
the population changes for those cohorts in 1990. So although there were
15China￿ s New Marriage Law in 1981 increased the age of marriage to 20 and 22 for
females and males, respectively. In our analysis, the youngest individual in our control
group would have been 26 in 1982, suggesting that any e⁄ect of the new marriage law on
their behavior through whom they could marry would have been marginal.
16The presence of lifecyle e⁄ects in marital behavior neccesitates using time variation
as a control group, i.e. we cannot use the marital behavior of 40 year olds in 1990 as a
control for the behavior of 30 year olds in 1990 due to lifecycle di⁄erences between the
two groups.
14likely other social and economic changes which a⁄ected the marital behavior
of these famine a⁄ected cohorts, including new o⁄-farm opportunities, mi-
gration opportunies and rising incomes, these other changes were primarily
level and trend changes which were orthogonal to the changes in population
supplies due to the famine which followed a very distinctive non-linear age
pattern. We do not know any other social or economic change that followed
this distinct age pattern and also only impacted these cohorts.
4 Sichuan
Figure 1 shows the number of individuals by age in rural counties in Sichuan
in 1990. The pre-famine cohort, 32-34, were a⁄ected by the famine. There
were less of them than 35 or 36 years olds. Absent the famine, due to
population growth and mortality risk, there should be less older individuals
rather than more in a given census year. Thus the 32-34 years olds were
adversely a⁄ected by the famine.
The famine born cohort, 29-31, is substantially smaller than the adjacent
cohorts, re￿ ecting primarily the fall in the birth rates of that cohort. Recov-
ery of the birth rates after the famine was very rapid. There is no visible
impact of the famine on cohort sizes after 1964, ages 25 or younger in 1990.
Figure 1 also shows that there were less 35 and 36 years olds than 37
olds, which implies that these cohorts were also a⁄ected by the famine. We
do not directly study their marital behavior because of our focus on the
marital behavior of the famine born cohort with their adjacent aged peers.
The analysis of the famine a⁄ected cohorts takes into account that they could
and did marry individuals 35 years old and older in 1990.
4.1 Marriage rates
Figure 2 shows two sex ratios by age. The dashed line is the sex ratio of
men to women for same age men and women. In general, the sex ratio is
slightly larger than one, which will have an e⁄ect on the male versus female
marriage rates.17 The famine had little to no impact on the sex ratio. There
is little evidence that male children were signi￿cantly favored over female
17The appendix shows that the sex ratios are in￿ uenced by di⁄erences in migration
between males and females in the two provinces. In Sichuan, the higher out migration of
females compared to men raises the sex ratio. The opposite is true in the case of Anhui.
15children among the famine a⁄ected cohorts. The solid line is the sex ratio by
women￿ s age where the men were three years older than the women. Here,
the e⁄ects of the famine are very clear. The sex ratio was above 2.5 for famine
born women because there were relatively more pre-famine born men. Also
the sex ratio fell to 0.25 for post-famine born women because there was a
relative scarcity of famine born men. If individuals valued the customary
age of marriage, there should have been large marriage market e⁄ects on the
famine a⁄ected cohorts.
Figure 3 plots the marriage rates for men and women by age in 1990 and
1982. First, the marriage rates for women in 1982 were similar for all three
control age groups (26-28,29-31,32-34). There is no evidence that the age
pattern of customary sex ratios in Figure 2 had any impact on the marriage
rates of these women in 1982. The 26 years olds in 1982, which overlapped
with the famine a⁄ected cohorts in 1990, do not display any unusual behavior
in 1982. Thus the female marriage rates in 1982 provide no evidence against
using 1982 as a control group for 1990 behavior.
In both census years, 1982 and 1990, and at all ages, female marriage rates
exceed 0.95. For women younger than age 40, marriage rates for women of
the same age were essentially the same in 1990 and 1982. In other words,
the famine a⁄ected women in 1990 had the same marriage rates as their
same age peers in 1982. Figure 2 earlier showed that the famine born women
were in relative scarcity and the post-famine women were in relative surplus
when compared to their customary spouses. This strongly suggests that the
famine a⁄ected women also married non-customary spouses and that these
substitutions to a ￿rst order left the marriage rates of famine a⁄ected women
unchanged.
In general, the male marriage rates in both 1982 and 1990 were lower
than the female marriage rates, consistent with the sex ratio being larger
than one in rural Sichuan.
In 1982, the marriage rates for men followed a relatively smooth concave
upward trend with age, with a small ￿ attening out at age 30. There is no
unusual movement at age 26, the year of overlap. There is no evidence that
the age pattern of customary sex ratios in Figure 2 had any impact on the
marriage rates of these men in 1982. Thus the male marriage rates in 1982
provide no evidence against using 1982 as a control group for 1990 behavior.
In 1990, the marriage rates for famine a⁄ected men were di⁄erent from
una⁄ected cohorts. The marriage rates of post-famine and famine born men
were higher than their older peers. Compared with 1982 men of the same
16ages, the marriage rates of pre-famine born men in 1990 were not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent. Compared with 1982 men of the same ages, the marriage rates of
famine and post-famine born men in 1990 were signi￿cantly higher. Thus,
both across age comparisons in 1990, and across years comparisons suggest
that the marriage rates of famine and post-famine born men were positively
a⁄ected by the famine.
Based on marriage rates between 1990 and 1982, a tentative conclusion
is that the marriage rates of famine a⁄ected women in 1990 were unchanged.
The marriage rates of pre-famine born men were una⁄ected whereas the
marriage rates of famine born and post-famine born men increased in 1990.
These conclusions are summarized in Figure 4. They are also consistent
with the ￿ndings in Almond et. al. The marriage rates of famine born
men increased by less than 5 percent compared to their 1982 peers. The
marriage rates of post-famine born men increased by substantially more, 5
to 15 percent more than their 1982 peers. But famine born men are scarce.
It is therefore surprising that the increase in their marriage rates was so
modest.
A caveat is necessary. While it is tempting to interpret the di⁄erence in
male marriage rates for the post and famine born cohorts as due to the famine
as we do above, the case for such an interpretation is weak. The comparison
of the female marriage rates showed no di⁄erence between treatment and
control cohorts. There was no di⁄erence between post-famine treatment and
control for men. The di⁄erence between treatment and control for both post
and famine born men were in the same direction. Thus what we observed
is a shift in marital behavior for young men in 1990. Other social economic
changes could have also a⁄ected the marital behavior of these young men
in 1990, most notably, rising family incomes with the implementation of
rural reforms in the late 1970s. The divergence in marriage rates for post-
famine males grew as individuals were born further away from the famine
years, contrary to the expectation that the e⁄ects of the famine were less for
individuals born further away from the famine years. Thus in addition to
famine e⁄ects, there surely were other shocks which also a⁄ected the marital
behavior between 1982 and 1990.
4.2 Marriage shares
To set the stage, it is convenient to have an idea of what customary marital
shares were. Figure 5 plots the distributions of husbands by spousal age dif-
17ferences for women who were 33, 30 and 27 in 1982. Because they were born
substantially before the famine, the marital behavior of 1982 women of those
ages should have been una⁄ected by the famine. We di⁄erentiate husbands
by their age gaps over their wives, from -3 years to +6 years. Husbands
within these 10 years ages interval account for 83-96% of all husbands. The
￿gure shows that there is essentially no di⁄erence in the distributions of hus-
bands by spousal age di⁄erences for these di⁄erent aged women in 1982. The
marital behavior of 1982 women of those ages was una⁄ected by the famine;
and their spousal choices as represented by spousal age di⁄erences did not
change with their age in 1982.
The 27 years olds in 1982, which are one-year removed from the overlap
cohort of age 26, did not display any unusual behavior in 1982. Figure 5 is
the strong case for using the 1982 cohorts as the control cohorts.
Turning to the e⁄ects of the famine, Figure 6 shows the marital partners
of three age cohorts of women in 1990: 27 (post-famine born), 30 (famine
born) and 33 (pre-famine born). First consider 33 years old women who were
born before the famine. Since women generally marry older men, Figure 2
tells us that the customary husbands of these women are not scarce. The
largest share of husbands was two years older. For 33 years old women in
1990, the age distribution of their spouses looks the same as their same age
peers in 1982 in Figure 5.
30 years old women were famine born women. They are scarce relative to
their customary husbands. Compared with the shares of 33 years old women,
their marriage shares distribution shifted to the right. Although they could
replicate the share distribution of the pre-famine women because they were
scarce relative to older men, more of them married older husbands.
27 years old women were born after the famine. They su⁄er a relative
scarcity of customary husbands. As shown in the ￿gure, their marriage share
distribution is almost symmetric around age gap [￿2;2]. It ￿ attens out
between age gap 2 to 4 and then increases. Thus, post-famine women married
a much larger share of own age or younger men, and also signi￿cantly older
men. The share of husbands in the age gap [￿2;2] was 0.83. Figure 6 shows
that in 1990, the distributions of husbands by spousal age di⁄erences were
signi￿cantly di⁄erent between pre-famine born, famine born and post-famine
born women.
Using the behavior of women in 1982 as control groups, Figure 7 plots
the ratio of 1990 husbands￿shares to 1982 shares for 27, 30 and 33 years old
women. If there is no di⁄erence in shares between 1982 and 1990 for the
18same age women, then the ratio should be 1. Consider the case of 33 years
old women. The ratio of shares are slightly above 1 for age gap between [0,4].
In both 1982 and 1990, most of the husbands of these 33 years old women
fell in the age gap between [0,4] years. The ratio of shares are lower than 1
below [0,4]. This says that in the [0,4] range, pre-famine born women in 1990
had the same relative distribution of husbands by spousal age di⁄erences as
their 1982 counterparts. But pre-famine women in 1990 had substantially
less younger husbands outside the range. Less younger husbands can be
explained by the relative scarcity of famine born men.
Famine born women in 1990, age 30, behaved very di⁄erently from their
1982 counterparts. They were far more likely to marry older men and far
less likely to marry men of the same age or younger.
Post-famine women in 1990, age 27, also behaved very di⁄erently from
their 1982 counterparts. They were far more likely to marry same age or
younger men, also pre-famine born men, and far less likely to marry famine
born men. So here, post-famine women avoided the scarce famine born men.
What is interesting is their increased demand for substantially older, pre-
famine born men. Both 27 and 30 years old women in 1990 had relatively
more demand for signi￿cantly older men.
Taken as a whole, Figure 7 shows that di⁄erent cohorts of famine a⁄ected
women responded di⁄erently in their spousal choices. Consistent with Al-
mond et. al. and Porter, there is a small increase in the average spousal age
gap for the famine a⁄ected cohorts relative to their 1982 peers. However this
average e⁄ect masks the heterogeneous responses by the di⁄erent famine af-
fected cohorts. It is also important to note that Figure 7 generates a pattern
of responses for the famine a⁄ected cohorts that would be hard to rationalize
based on other social and economic changes which occured in China.
4.3 Total gains
To preview what we will ￿nd, recall that marriages rates of famine born
women were the same as their pre and post-famine born peers. The marriage
rates of famine born men were lower than their post-famine born peers. But
famine born men and women are relatively scarce in the marriage market.
Let j denote the cohort of famine born women and i denote their customary
spouses. To a ￿rst order, ot
j did not change and j type women are scarce
relative to type i men. st
ijj must fall and by equation (5), ￿t
ij must fall.
To investigate the change in total gains for famine a⁄ected cohorts, we
19￿rst consider total gains of individuals who were born before the famine.
Figure 8 shows total gains for 27, 30 and 33 years old women and their
spouses from -3 years to +6 years older in 1982. Total gains for 30 and 33
years old women and their spouses were similar in 1982. Total gains for 27
years old women, while similar in shape, were lower than the other two age
cohorts. This is expected because the marriage rate for 27 years old women
were lower than the other two age cohorts. Thus it is reasonable to use the
1982 individuals as control groups for their same age 1990 peers.
Figure 9 plots total gains of three age cohorts of women in 1990, 27 (post-
famine born), 30 (famine born) and 33 (pre-famine born) and their husbands.
Starting with pre-famine born 33 years old women and their spouses, total
gains is a smooth concave function in husband￿ s age gap. Total gains from
[0,4] were relatively similar. Total gains of post-famine born 27 years old
women and their spouses were in general similar to the pre-famine women.
Where they di⁄er, and total gains were lower for post-famine women, were
with husbands between 1 to 3 years older. For post-famine born women,
these husbands were famine born men. Thus, marrying famine born men
resulted in lower total gains to marriage relative to the pre-famine women
with spouses 1 to 3 years older.
Total gains for famine born women, age 30, and their spouses were sig-
ni￿cantly lower than that of pre and post-famine born women. Figure 3
shows that the marriage rates of famine born women were similar to pre and
post-famine women. There are some small di⁄erences in the marriage rates
of the husbands (measured by age gaps) of famine born and other famine
a⁄ected women. But there were large di⁄erences in the customary marriage
sex ratios as shown in Figure 2. These large di⁄erences in the customary
marriage sex ratios should have resulted in signi￿cantly di⁄erent marriage
rates for famine born and other famine a⁄ected women. But because the
marriage rates for all the famine a⁄ected women were roughly the same in
spite of large di⁄erences in customary marital sex ratios, total gains for the
famine born women had to be lower than the other famine a⁄ected women.
Figure 10 presents the di⁄erence in total gains between 1990 and 1982
for the same age women and their spouses. The di⁄erences in total gains
were negative for the famine born women, age 30, for all spousal ages. The
di⁄erence in total gains for 33 years old women between the two censuses was
mostly a little larger than zero. It was negative for marriages with famine
born husbands. The di⁄erence in total gains for 27 years old women were
largely above zero. It dipped to zero for famine born husbands. Both pre and
20post-famine born women primarily had larger total gains from marriage than
their same age 1982 counterparts unless they married famine born husbands.
The famine born women and their spouses had total gains that were lower
than their 1982 counterparts. This shows that the famine had a signi￿cant,
concentrated negative e⁄ect on famine born cohorts, both men and women.
Finally, the non-linear heterogenous changes in total gains for famine
a⁄ected cohorts are hard to explain by other factors which may have also
a⁄ected the marriage market between the two periods.
4.4 Quantity and quality
So far, our discussion was descriptive. Taken together, the ￿rst di⁄erences in
the three statistics strongly suggest that the famine had substantial e⁄ects
on the marital behavior of the famine a⁄ected cohorts. The change in marital
behavior for the pre, post and famine born cohorts are su¢ ciently di⁄erent
from each other that it is di¢ cult to explain these ￿rst di⁄erence changes by
other social economic factors.
How important are quantity versus quality e⁄ects? We will ￿rst argue
that it is implausible that the observed total e⁄ects of the famine are due
exclusively to one or the other e⁄ect.
Figure 7, which plots the ratio of 1990/1982 marriage shares of husbands
by his age gap, provides strong evidence for the importance of quantity ef-
fects. Figure 7 shows that famine born women were able to marry a larger
share of husbands of customary age than the 1982 same aged wives. The
famine born wives also avoided their share of same-aged husbands compared
to 1982 same-aged peers. In addition, Figure 7 shows that post-famine wives
also married a lower share of famine born husbands compared with their same
aged peers. So both famine born and post-famine wives relatively avoided
famine born husbands. Yet the marriage rates of famine born men were
higher than their 1982 peers. The relative scarcity of famine born men and
women reconciles this set of disparate observations.
On the other hand, it is di¢ cult to explain the di⁄erences in total gains in
Figure 10 with quantity e⁄ects alone. If famine born women were relatively
scarce, and there was no change in the marital attractiveness of these women,
it is hard to explain why the di⁄erence in total gains was negative for famine
born women, age 30, for all spousal ages.
Thus the changes in marital shares and total gains suggest that both
quantity and quality e⁄ects are important in explaining the change in marital
21behavior of the famine a⁄ected cohorts. The next step is to quantify the
importance of the two factors.
We will now use the CS model to do that decomposition. Equation (8)
says that the estimated total gains are estimates of structural parameters
of the CS model. In particular, the total gains for an fi;jg marriage is
the average payo⁄ for a spouse in that marriage relative to them remaining
unmarried. The di⁄erence in total gains measures the change in this relative
payo⁄ between t0 and t, as per equation (9).
It is easy to use CS to interpret Figure 10. The di⁄erences in total gains
were negative for the famine born women, age 30, for all spousal ages. They
are particularly negative for same age or slightly younger husbands. In other
words, the marital output of marriages with famine born women were lower
compared to their same age counterpart in 1982. And if their husband is
also famine born, the payo⁄was even worse. On the other hand, the marital
output of marriages with pre-famine born women were marginally higher
than their same aged counterpart in 1982, validating the Meng and Qian
hypothesis that children who survived the famine were positively selected.
Finally, the di⁄erence in total gains for 27 years old women were largely
above zero. It dipped below zero for famine born husbands. What this
means is that the marital outputs of both famine born men and famine born
women su⁄ered substantial drop relative to their 1982 same aged peers. Thus
the CS model unambiguously shows that the famine born cohort su⁄ered a
substantial drop in marital attractivenss.
Given this drop in the relative marital output of famine born spouses,
why did their marriage rates not drop? An explanation is that they were
in relatively short supply in the marriage market. To quantify the e⁄ect of
the changes in quantities on marital behavior, we use the 1982 CS structural
estimates to predict what the marriage distribution in 1990 would have been
with 1990 population vectors and 1982 estimated parameters (i.e. b ￿t0
ij using
equation (10)). We also make a similar 1990 prediction using the harmonic
mean MMF with 1982 estimated parameters.
Figures 11a and 11b show for Sichuan, the predicted male and female mar-
riage rates from the two models respectively. For both genders, the predicted
marriage rates from the harmonic mean MMF often exceed 1, an inadmis-
sible prediction. These violations occur because the harmonic mean MMF
does not impose required general equilibrium accounting identities, ignores
substitution e⁄ects, and the changes in sex ratios of customary spousal age
di⁄erences were large. Thus as previous researchers have observed, the stan-
22dard MMF used by demographers is a poor empirical MMF.
On the other hand, the predicted marriage rates from the CS MMF be-
have sensibly. In Figures 11a and 11b, the predicted marriage rates are above
average for the famine born cohorts and below average for the adjacent aged
birth cohorts. No accounting constraint is violated. Note that actual female
marriage rates were over 0.95 for most ages. Even with large changes in
sex ratios of the customary spousal age di⁄erences for the famine born co-
horts, their predicted marriage rates remained below 1. The predicted female
marriage rates for famine born cohorts were very similar to those predicted
for adjacent aged cohorts. In other words, the CS MMF respects both the
general equilibrium accounting constraints of MMFs and also captures the
￿ exibility of individuals in their marital choices. These two attributes show
the advantage of the CS MMF over the harmonic mean MMF.
In Figure 11a, famine born and post-famine males had lower marriage
rates than predicted by CS. Pre famine born males had higher marriage
rates than predicted by CS. Changes in relative scarcities of the di⁄erent
types of individuals caused by the famine cannot explain these discrepancies.
The famine must have also changed marital attractiveness to marriage for
these cohorts.
Figure 11b shows that the discrepancies between predicted and actual
female marriage rates were small. CS is able to generate predicted male
marriage rates that were highly responsive to changes in population supplies
and female marriage rates that were marginally responsive. It is clear that
changes in population supplies alone cannot explain the observed changes in
marriage rates. We also need to account for changes in marital attractiveness
of the famine a⁄ected cohorts.
Figure 11e shows the ratio of actual to predicted marriage shares for
women in 1990 by the age gaps of their husbands. Consider ￿rst the mar-
riage shares of 39 years old famine born women. Their actual shares of own
age and pre-famine born husbands exceed the predicted shares. The actual
shares were more concentrated among these husbands than were predicted
by changes in population vectors alone. In other words, drop in marital at-
tractiveness of the famine born cohort led them to marry even more of their
own type. Due to adding up constraints in the marriage market, (1), when
actual shares are di⁄erent from predicted shares for one cohort, they also
must be di⁄erent for other cohorts. This shows up for pre-famine born 33
years old women. Their actual shares of own age and older husbands also ex-
ceed the predicted shares. Finally for post-famine born 27 years old women,
23the actual shares of own age husbands exceed the predicted shares and the
reverse occurs for famine born husbands. This is evidence that post-famine
born women ￿avoided￿famine born husbands.
Figures 10, 11a, 11b and 11e provide a uni￿ed summary of the e⁄ects
of the famine on the marital behavior of famine a⁄ected cohorts. Figure 10
shows that the relative marital output of famine born cohorts fell substan-
tially. By itself, the drop in relative marital output would have substantially
reduced the marriage rates of the famine born cohorts. The famine also sub-
stantially reduced the relative supply of the famine born cohorts. Figures
11a and 11b show that these reductions would have substantially changed
the marriage rates of the famine a⁄ected cohorts. To a ￿rst order, the si-
multaneous changes in quantities and qualities cancelled each other out and
resulted in small changes in marriage rates for the famine a⁄ected cohorts.
If marital output did not change, Figure 11c shows that famine born women
would have been less likely to marry, and post-famine born women would
have been more likely to marry famine born men than what they did.
4.5 Education e⁄ects
Since the famine had a negative impact on the health and human capital
endowments of famine born individuals (see Almond et. al. (2007), Gorgens
et. al. (2005), St. Clair et. al. (2005), Luo, Mu and Zhang (2006)),
their educational attainment may have been a⁄ected. This may enable us to
use the change in educational attainment of that cohort to proxy for their
drop in marital attractiveness, thereby explaining their drop in total gains
to marriage.
Figure 12 shows the fraction of women who had less than a primary school
education by age. Not surprising, in both the 1990 and 1982 censuses, the
fraction grew with the age of the women. It is di¢ cult to see the change in
educational attainment at the levels for the famine born cohort. This implies
that it is unlikely that the change in educational attainment of the famine
born cohort will be able to explain the changes in total gains to marriage of
that cohort.
Figure 13 shows the log di⁄erence (growth rate) of the fraction of women
who had less than a primary school education by age. In the 1982 census,
the growth rate fell rapidly by age for women below age 35. Such a decline
in the growth rate should be expected if women increased their educational
attainment over time. In the 1990 census, the growth rate also fell by age for
24women above age 32. For women between ages 28 and 32, the growth rate
of the fraction of women with less than a primary school eduction formed a
valley with a bottom at age 30. Based on deviations from trend growth, the
famine a⁄ected cohorts had less education than they would otherwise have.
Although we do not present the results here, the results for male educational
attainment are similar. Figure 13 raises the possibility that changes in the
growth rate of education of the famine a⁄ected cohorts may be able to explain
some of the fall in total gains to marriage of those cohorts.
Denote individuals with more than a primary education as high educa-
tion and those with a primary education or less as low education. Figure 14
shows the ratio of 1990 to 1982 female marriage rates by age and education.
High education women were less likely to marry in 1990 than in 1982 com-
pared with their low education peers. For high educated famine born women
(age 30), the ratio is slightly higher than their adjacent aged peers. For low
educated famine born women, the ratio is slightly lower than their adjacent
aged peers. These small di⁄erences in marriage rates suggest that high ed-
ucated famine born women may have fared better than their low education
counterparts.
To evaluate the overall e⁄ects of the changes in educational attainment on
marital behavior, we estimate total gains ￿1982
ij for every {i;jg match where
a type is de￿ned by the individual￿ s age and education (high versus low). We
then use the estimated total gains, ￿1982
ij , to predict the marriage distribution
in 1990, b ￿1990
ij , due to changes in population vectors alone. Figure 15 plots
the ratio of the own predicted gender marriage rates in 1990 to the actual
marriage rates in 1990 by age, b rt
g(rt
g)￿1, g = i;j.
Figure 15, where predictions depend on age and education, looks remark-
ably similar to Figure 8 where the predictions only depend on age. In other
words, the change in educational attainment of the famine born cohort did
not have a ￿rst-order impact on predicted marriage rates.
To examine this more closely, Figure 16 plots 1990-1982 total gains for
marriages with two high educated spouses. Total gains for post-famine
women were higher than their 1982 peers. But note that relative total gains
for post-famine married women fell as the age of their husbands increased
from own age to famine born husbands. So famine born men also had lower
total gains. Total gains for famine born and pre-famine women were slightly
lower than their 1982 peers. Figure 17 plots total gains for marriages with
two low educated spouses. Total gains for pre and post-famine women were
higher than their 1982 peers. On the other hand, total gains for famine
25born women were substantially lower than their 1982 peers. Figures 16 and
17 suggest that among famine born women, low educated women su⁄ered a
larger drop in total gains than high educated women.
5 Anhui
In general, the e⁄ects of the famine on the marital behavior of the famine
a⁄ected cohorts in Anhui were about the same as for Sichuan.
Figure 1a and 2a present the number of individuals by age in 1990 in
Anhui, and the same age sex ratio as well as the sex ratio for men three
years older by female age. These two ￿gures are similar to what we saw for
Sichuan. In particular, the timing of the e⁄ects of the famine on birth rates
in both provinces were the same.
Figure 3a shows the male and female marriage rates in 1982 and 1990.
As the ￿gure shows, female marriage rates between 1982 and 1990 were
very similar. Across most ages, male marriage rates were lower in 1982.
One potential explanation for the higher male marriage rates in 1990 is that
relatively more unmarried men left the province in 1990 than in 1982.18
To see the e⁄ects of the famine more clearly, Figure 4a shows the ratio of
1990 to 1982 marriage rates by gender and age. There is a small dip in the
marriage rate of famine born females relative to pre and post-famine born
cohorts. This dip is more visible for males. Quantitatively, the e⁄ects are
not large, within 2-3% di⁄erence. These dips are di⁄erent from their Sichuan
counterparts.
Note however that because famine born individuals are relatively scarce,
these dips in marriage rates should be re￿ ected in signi￿cant drops in total
gains for famine born individuals.
Figure 5a shows that in 1982, Anhui women at ages 27, 30 and 33 had
very similar shares of husbands by spousal age di⁄erences. Figure 6a shows
that in 1990, Anhui women at ages 27, 30 and 33 had di⁄erent shares of
husbands by spousal age di⁄erences.
Figure 7a shows the 1990 shares divided by the 1982 shares. For 1990 33
years old wives (pre-famine born females), their shares of same age or older
husbands were roughly the same as for the 1982 wives. On the other hand,
18As discussed earlier, our identi￿cation of the famine e⁄ect is not based on levels or
trend changes.
26the 1990 share of younger husbands (famine born males) were lower than
their 1982 peers.
For 1990 30 years old (famine born) wives, their shares of own age hus-
bands were lower than older or younger husbands compared with their 1982
peers. Finally, 1990 27 years old (post-famine) wives, their shares of own age
spouses were signi￿cantly higher than famine born spouses, but comparable
to pre-famine born spouses when compared with their 1982 peers. That is,
post-famine born wives were more likely to have own age or pre-famine born
spouses.
The behavior of 33 years old (pre-famine) and 27 years old (post-famine)
wives with respect to their choices of husbands were similar to that of Sichuan
women. However famine born Anhui wives were more likely to marry own
aged spouses compared with their Sichuan counterparts.
Figure 8a shows the total gains for 27, 30 and 33 years old women in
1982. Although the shape of the three curves are similar, total gains for 27
years old women were lower than for 30 and 33 years old women. Figure 9a
shows the total gains for 27, 30 and 33 years old women in 1990. Total gains
for 30 years old women were signi￿cantly lower than for 33 years old and
roughly comparable to 27 years olds. Total gains for own age spouses for 30
years old women were lower than those for pre and post-famine women.
Figure 10a shows 1990 total gains minus 1982 total gains. The most stark
feature is that the di⁄erence in total gains for 30 years old women were lower
than that for 27 and 33 years old women at all spousal age di⁄erences. In
other words, famine born women were less desirable as spouses compared to
their same age counterparts in 1982.
For 33 years old women (i.e the pre-famine cohort and their same age
counterparts), the di⁄erence in total gains were above zero with own age and
older husbands. It was lower than zero for younger (famine born) husbands.
Finally, total gains for 27 years old (post-famine born) women were higher
than their 1982 peers for own age and younger men, but lower than their 1982
peers for older (famine born) men. Thus Figure 10a unambiguously show
that famine born individuals had lower total gains to marriage compared
with 1982 same age peers or with pre and post-famine born individuals.
Figures 11c and 11d show the ratios of 1990 predicted marriage rates
by age to actual marriage rates using ￿82
ij where the type of an individual
is de￿ned by their age. The model underpredicts the number of marriages
for post-famine born women. It substantially over predicts the number of
married famine born men, and under predicts the marriage rates of pre- and
27post- famine born men. Thus we know that total gains must have changed
between 1982 and 1990 for the same age groups.
Figure 11f shows the ratio of 1990 actual to predicted marriage shares
using ￿82
ij where the type of an individual is de￿ned by their age. 30 years
old famine born women married much more own age men and less pre-famine
born men than were predicted. Post famine born 27 years old women were
less likely to marry famine born men than were predicted. Thus post-famine
women ￿avoided￿famine born men.
Figures 12a and 13a show the fraction of women with primary or lower
education and the growth in that fraction by age in 1990 and 1982 respec-
tively. As in Sichuan, educational attainment declined with age. In Figure
13a, there is a sharp jump in the growth rate of low education famine born,
age 30, women which shows that the famine born generation had less edu-
cational attainment than expected. But as shown in Figure 12a, the level
e⁄ect is small.
Figure 14a shows the ratio of 1990 to 1982 female marriage rates. For
women with low education, the marriage rates of the famine born cohort
were slightly lower than pre and post-famine born women. For women with
high education, famine born women su⁄er a larger dip in their marriage rates
relative to pre and post-famine born women.
Figure 15a shows the ratio of predicted marriage rates by age to actual
marriage rates using ￿82
ij where the type of an individual is de￿ned by their
age and education. The Figure is almost identical to Figure 8a where the type
of an individual is de￿ned by age alone. What this means is that accounting
for the changes in educational attainment between same age 1982 and 1990
indviduals did not account for the changes in marital quality of the famine
born individuals.
Figure 16a shows 1990 minus 1982 total gains for high educated women
with high educated men. famine born high educated women (age 30) had
weakly lower total gains compared with their 1982 peers. Total gains for
pre-famine born high educated women were roughly the same as their 1982
peers. Post famine born educated women had higher total gains than their
1982 peers, although there was a small relative dip with older (famine born)
men.
Figure 17a shows 1990 minus 1982 total gains for low educated women
with low educated men. famine born low educated women (age 30) had
signi￿cantly lower total gains compared with their 1982 peers. Total gains
were relatively higher with same age males. Total gains for pre-famine born
28high educated women were roughly the same as their 1982 peers for own
age and older men. They were lower with younger (famine born) men. Post
famine born educated women had the same total gains than their 1982 peers
with own age or pre-famine born men. They had lower gains with famine
born men.
Comparing ￿gures 16a and 17a, high educated famine born individuals
su⁄ered a smaller loss in total gains to marriage than their low educated
counterparts. This ￿nding is comparable to that for Sichuan.
6 Conclusion
There were little changes in the marriage rates of the famine born cohorts
relative to their adjacent aged peers in 1990 or same age peers in 1982. To a
￿rst approximation, our decomposition shows that the bene￿t that the famine
born cohort derived from their relative scarcity is o⁄set by their decline in
marital attractiveness. Thus the main conclusion of this paper is that the
small observed changes in marriage rates of the famine born cohorts are due
to a substantial decline in their marital attractiveness.
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32Data Appendix
All data are either from the 1% household sample of the 1982 Census of
China, or the 1% clustered sample of the 1990 Census of China. Our samples
are individuals in rural counties of Sichuan and Anhui, over the age of 18.
There are issues common to both censuses, as well as di⁄erences between
them, that required attention for the analysis in this paper. This appendix
describes the most important of those issues.
Sampling. The microdata sample for 1982 was sampled at the house-
hold level, while the 1990 ￿clustered￿sample was sampled at the level of the
administrative unit. Lavely and Mason (2006) discusses the geographic cov-
erage of the 1990 sample and compares summary statistics from the sample
to tabulations from the complete census. They concludes that, aside from a
few discrepencies, the sample ￿reproduces the geographic distribution of pop-
ulation and major population components quite well.￿We would not expect
the di⁄erent sampling methods to bias our results. The marriage markets
we investigate are de facto de￿ned as the subset of rural counties in each
province. While the two census samples will contain exactly the same coun-
ties, they ought to both have a representative sample of rural households in
each province.
De￿ning rural areas. Our analysis covers rural counties in Sichuan and
Anhui. There has been much research and debate about the best de￿nitions
of rural and urban populations for various purposes (see Chan (1994), Martin
(1992) and Shen (1995). The ￿o¢ cial￿de￿nitions in fact changed between
the 1982 and 1990 censuses. Our intention, in analyzing only rural areas, is to
look at those areas most severely a⁄ected by the famine, and avoid con￿ ating
the very di⁄erent e⁄ects su⁄ered by cities and villages. Also, since the 1982
and 1990 use di⁄erent classi￿cations for the smaller geographic units, we
wanted to select geographic areas on criteria which could be consistently
applied in both censuses.
Both censuses de￿ne the largest three levels of geographic units according
to a six digit goubiao (GB) code. The ￿rst two digits de￿ne the province (or
municipalities like Beijing and Tianjin, which report directly to the central
government). The second two digits de￿ne a prefecture within the province,
and the last two label the counties within the prefecture. See Chan (1994) for
a diagram of these levels in the two censuses. Within Sichuan and Anhui, we
select those counties whose last two digits indicate they are xian (as opposed
to shi or shixiaqu, which refer to urban areas). This de￿nition will generally
33not capture the same households as those included in the o¢ cial de￿nition.19
Migration. Migration introduces a number of potential biases into our
analysis. In the construction of sex ratios for the rural-born population at
the provincial level, our population of interest is those males and females
born in rural Anhui and Sichuan that survive to marriageable age. In the
use of the 1982 and 1990 census data, this implies that we should include all
individuals born in rural areas in Anhui and Sichuan that migrated either
to the cities or to other provinces. Analogously, we should exclude those
individuals born outside of Anhui and Sichuan that migrated into rural areas
in these provinces. For the ￿rst di⁄erence methodology we use, we need
information on migration in both census years in order to use alternative
estimates of the sex ratios in our analysis.
In the 1982 census, no information is provided on place of birth, or migra-
tion. In the 1990 census, place of birth is again not provided, but information
on migration between 1985 and 1990 is. In 1985, the famine a⁄ected cohort,
i.e. those born between 1956 and 1964, would have been between the ages of
21-29, and by 1990, 26-34. Thus, data on migration between 1985 and 1990
will pick up some, but not all, of the movement in and out of rural areas in
these provinces, especially that related to marriage.
In the case of Anhui, 1.02 percent of all women with rural registration
between the ages of 26-34 in 1990 report migrating out of the province within
the last ￿ve years. The percentage for marriage however, was only a third of
this. This is slightly misleading because a signi￿cant number of these women
would have already been married by 1985. For the youngest women, i.e.
those born between 1962 and 1964, and in 1985 were between 21 and 23, 0.5
percent migrated for marriage. For males, 1.74 percent migrated, but only
0.14 percent was marriage-related. Migration into rural Anhui was slightly
smaller, but in absolute terms, the numbers of males and females migrating
in and out of rural Anhui were nearly o⁄setting.
In the case of Sichuan, 1.41 percent of all women between the ages of
26-34 migrated, with 0.88 percent marriage-related. As in the case of Anhui,
the percentage was higher for younger women. For men, the percentage that
migrated out was 1.51, but only one-tenth was because of marriage. The
primary reason was for work. Flows into rural Sichuan were smaller than the
out￿ ows, with the net out￿ ow of women for marriage equal to 0.63 percent of
19In earlier versions of the analyses, we also used a de￿nition based on the share of
individuals working in rural sectors. This de￿nition resulted in a similar sample of counties.
34the cohort. Overall, there was a small net out￿ ow of females from Sichuan.
The 2000 census provides slightly richer information on migration that
can be used to get a better sense of how serious these biases are. Of course,
by 2000, attrition is also a much more serious problem. From the 2000
census, we know where an individual was born; where they were living at
the time of the census; and if they had migrated in the last ￿ve years, the
reason. The latter information is slightly less useful by 2000 because the
cohort of interest would have been between the ages of 36- 44. We utilize this
information along with that on an individual￿ s registration status or hukou
to identify the following: 1. Individuals with rural hukou that were born in
Anhui (Sichuan) that are currently living in urban areas in Anhui or in other
provinces; 2.Individuals with rural hukou that were born in Anhui (Sichuan)
that are currently living in rural areas in other provinces; 3.Individuals with
rural hukou that were born outside Anhui (Sichuan), but are currently living
in rural areas in these two provinces. We construct an alternative estimate of
the sex-ratio for rural-born Anhui (Sichuan) by adding individuals in groups
1 and 2 to those individuals who the census identi￿es as currently living in
rural Anhui (Sichuan), and then subtracting individuals in group 3. There
are two remaining omissions relating to the rural born between 1956 and 1964
that we cannot deal with. First, individuals that made it to marriageable
age, but died before 2000. And second, individuals that were rural-born, but
who at the time of the 2000 census had urban registration.
We graph old and new sex ratios in Figures A1 and A2. In the case
of Anhui, larger out-migration ￿ ows by males and larger in-migration ￿ ows
by women results in a slightly higher M/F ratio on average across all age
cohorts. The bias is slightly higher for the famine born cohort, followed by
the pre-famine cohort, and then the post-famine cohort. Overall, however,
the bias (as measured by the ratio of the new sex ratio to the old sex ratio)
is in the ballpark of 5% for the cohort born between 1956 and 1964. In the
case of Sichuan, women are more likely than men to have migrated out of
the province, with this only marginally o⁄set by slightly higher in-migration
of women than men into rural Sichuan. As a result, the new sex-ratio is
slightly lower than the original estimate. This bias is fairly similar over all
age cohorts, and again is in the vicinity of 5 percent. Overall, the small size
of the bias, combined with the fact that the di⁄erences across cohorts are
relatively small increases our con￿dence in our identi￿cation strategy.
De￿ning married couples within households. Except for household
heads and their spouses, the census does not provide any de￿nite way to
35determine who is married to whom within the household. Also, it provides
no way to identify a person￿ s spouse if that spouse does not live in the same
household. For example, a male and female household member whose marital
statuses are both ￿Married￿and are identi￿ed ￿Children of the household
head￿may be married to each other (and one is a son-in-law or daughter-in-
law). Or it is possible that they are both biological children of the household
head who are married to spouses living outside the household.
Assuming that the ￿rst possibility is the more likely, we determine the
married couples within households according to the following rules. First, we
identify all ￿potential￿married couples within each households as those who
are of the opposite sex and have consistent relationships to the household
head (both children of the head, or parents of the head, etc.). For children
of household heads, we also required that potential couples be within ￿ve
years of age.20 If each person in the household has only one potential spouse,
we de￿ne them to be married. If a person has multiple potential spouses,
we assign married couples through positive assortive matching by age, e.g.,
the oldest married male child is married to the oldest married female child
within ￿ve years his age.
Determining spouses was by far most problematic for children of house-
hold Heads, simply because there were more of these than parents, grandpar-
ents, grandchildren, etc. Fortunately, in the majority of households, there
was only one potential married couple amongst the children.21 In Sichuan,
amongst households where there was at least one potential married child
couple, 93.3% had only one potential couple, while 99.6% had two poten-
tial combinations or less. In Anhui, household sizes were slightly larger, as
only 83% of households with at least one potential child couple had only one
potential couple, while 93.6% had no more than two potential combinations.
Imputing missing spouses. For some individuals, there were no po-
tential spouses in their household; for example, there were households where
20We performed tests of these rules by relaxing the age assumption, and comparing
marriage age distributions of the full sample with the restricted sample of household heads
and their spouses.
21We calculate the potential married couple combinations amongst children in a house-
hold to be P(I;J) if J < I, or P(J;I) otherwise, where I is the number of married male
children in the household, J is the number of married female children in the household
and P(￿;￿) is the permutation operator. For example, a household with one married fe-
male child and two married male children has two potential child couple combinations.
One with three female children and two male children (or vice versa) has six potential
combinations.
36the household head was married, but no spouse was present; or there were
households with an odd number of married children. We imputed the age
and education of these individuals￿spouses by assigning values randomly
from the distribution of spouse age and eduction for those of the same sex
and age in that province with non-missing spouses.
37Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Census year 1982 1990
Province Sichuan Anhui Sichuan Anhui
No. men 18-50 188,081 91,898 225,261 127,600
No. women 18-50 179,727 86,245 221,750 124,236
Share ever married men 0.737 0.719 0.719 0.700
Share ever married women 0.846 0.814 0.802 0.769
Mean (woman￿ s - spouse￿ s age) -3.216 -2.776 -2.664 -2.436
Share of high edu (male) 0.302 0.349 0.440 0.474
Share of high edu(female) 0.195 0.149 0.295 0.207
Table 2: Famine a⁄ected cohorts and their comparison groups
Pre famine Famine Post famine
Birth years 1956-1958 1959-1961 1962-1964
1982 ages 24-26 21-23 18-20
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